Deus ex machina

“Successful reference requires only that the object referred to be thought of or mentally identified, not that it exist. If this is correct, then it is not really clear why the maxim of Quality needs to be suspended at all. We can refer to fictional objects (though they do not exist) and thus doing so would appear not to involve us in any violation of Quality.”

First of all, I would like to send my apologies to any reader that has realized that this is my 3^rd blogpost in a row that is somehow related to the piece of writing that DKJ posted at the end of last week. I found this reading very approachable, and also very intriguing. If you have not read by previous two blog posts, you may not be aware of the article I am mentioning. Well, it is titled “Fiction as Action”, and it was written by Sarah Hoffman.

Of course, I mention this article once again because I took the quote above is taken from that reading. I wanted to comment on the idea that the so-called maxim of quality does not apply to works of fiction. Hoffman explains that this maxim originally derived from classical theorist Paul Grice. Searle and other speech act theorists have maintained that normal language usage (or at least, illocutionary language) abides by this maxim of quality, but fiction does not. This is because the author of fiction would not be able to abide by these rules when making fictitious assertions. For example, they cannot possible commit themselves to the truth of the assertion. Accordingly, Searle and others maintain that this is not important because works of fiction do not apply to the maxim of quality.

Hoffman challenges this claim by bringing up the possibility that the author of a work of fiction may not be making an assertion, but rather simply making reference to an idea. Furthermore, as the quote above points out, since successful reference does not require that an object actually exist, the maxim of quality does not need to be suspended, let alone considered. I may have this wrong, but this seems to lead to the question of whether fictitious works make assertions or instead, whether they just are making reference to a fictional object (not claiming that it actually exists).

Notes:

When engaged in conversation, the Maxim of Quality requires that you:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

This will be the second blog post in which I make reference to a piece of writing that DKJ linked to at the end of last week. The piece is written by Sarah Hoffman, and it is a critique of various views of fiction, some of which we read last week. While reading Hoffman’s piece, there was one point that specifically struck me as being significantly important and veracious.

Hoffman comments on Currie at one point in her writing, and although we were not required to read Currie, I still felt that her point was extremely relevant to our class discussions. Hoffman states that Currie makes a major mistake when maintaining that fictitious works exist on a lexical basis that is completely independently from normal lexical usage. In other words, the denotation and connotation of words in a work of fiction have absolutely no relationship to their meanings in the so-called “real-world”. I completely agree with Hoffman in that this idea is completely erroneous. Furthermore, although this idea may seem clearly wrong to a lot of people, it seems that throughout our discussions in class, there are some that still hold this view.

I think that that is absolutely egregious that it is maintained by many that the world created by a piece of fictitious work holds no relationship with the non-fictional world. Although the meaning of words in a work of fiction can have novel meanings, that would seem to have no relationship to their meaning in its conventional context, there is no way in which it can have no relationship. Hoffman illustrates this when she states, “But we know that sentences in fiction do not have novel fictional meanings—they have the same meanings that they have when used in non-fictional contexts. So fiction cannot be characterized by some unique speech act(s)” (Hoffmann 8). I thought it was important that Hoffman made this statement because I think the misconception that word meanings in works of fiction exist completely independent of their normal use if far too prevalent.

“What role does the viewer/reader play in the process of conveying fiction?”

“Does Searle’s view discount the role of the viewer/reader?”

Looking at this question now, it seems that it comes off as slightly convoluted and not fully to the point. Hopefully, while attempting my own question, I will be able to ameliorate the question itself somewhat. The idea for this question arose while I read through an article that Dave posted on his blog towards the end of last week. The article was written by Sarah Hoffman, and it attempted to critique the various views that exist on the topic of fiction. While she certainly made strong, poignant points in regards to her thoughts on each writers view, I specifically enjoyed her critique of Searle.

Hoffman highlighted numerous problems with Searle’s view of fiction, but one of the central flaws that she notes is the fact that Searle discounts the impact of the viewer. Hoffman identifies Searle’s view as the speech act approach to fiction, and states that this view places too much emphasis on the word structure of fictitious works, and not enough on the actually interpreter of the work. After reading Hoffman’s comments, I was forced to wonder: what role/ what impact does the viewer actually have in the context of interpreting fictitious work?

Answering this question under the view of someone like Kendall Walton, it would seem that the viewer has an enormous impact in the process of interpreting fiction. For example, as we discussed in class, Walton brings up the example of a rock with an image presented on it, which a viewer interprets as a story. Of course, this type of fictional work would have no author, but still would exist. Accordingly, this sort of example emphasizes the role that the viewer has in the effect of fiction.

Does this mean that the speech act approach to fiction discounts the role of the viewer? It should be mentioned that Searle does place a lot of emphasis on the intentions of the author. He lists a set of pragmatic and semantic rules that apply when an author makes assertions and questions whether assertions made in works of fiction abide by these same rules. He concludes that a fictitious work does not actually follow these rules because the author is only performing a pretend illocutionary act.

This is where it seems that Searle may be placing too much emphasis on the author’s intentions. It does not seem that the author is performing a pretend illocutionary act, but rather a “real” illocutionary act. Furthermore, I think that it is the reader that for lack of better terminology makes fiction what it is. It is the reader that must move throughout this fictional plane created by the author; a plane that was created by purposefully. Although, I think that works of fiction without an author are anomalous, I think that they make an important point: The reader/viewer is essential part of fiction; more essential than the author of the work themselves.