Deus ex machina

In Response to Krystal (4/4/2012)

Krystal brings up the always-good subject of interpretations. More specifically, she questions the idea that certain interpretations are “better” than others. In Krystal’s words, as “long as there is nothing in an interpretation that is blatantly at odds with the text then it should be considered a valid interpretation at the very least”. I would agree that all interpretations of this sort should be considered “valid”, but, in my view, these “valid” interpretations could then be ranked in order of the “best” interpretations. How would they be ranked? I suppose they would by determining the amount of questions that each interpretation is able to answer.

Novel Contributions? /In Response to Avery

In Avery’s recent post, the primary topic is literature’s ability to contribute to other forms of human understanding. I find this topic to be particularly important because, in recent class discussions, we have continued to address this contentious issue. Many believe that literature can only support ideas that have come up previously in scientific disciplines. Even further, some theorists maintain that, although literature may be able to first discover a certain idea, since it would have been discovered anyways by science, literatures discovery is surpassed by science.

What I find interesting about this view is the fact that I previously identified with it. Before are class discussion I thought is was veracious to claim that any idea that literature could possibly discover already existed in the great world; therefore, literature was not able to bring new ideas to light, but only support previously existing ideas. Now looking at it, it seems trivial to state that any idea discovered in literature previously existed in the so-called “great world”. Of course it did; but, this does not discount the fact that literature can discover these issues antecedently to scientific disciplines. Accepted prima facie, it seems certainly possible that literature has discovered certain ideas prior to science. I truly doubt that science is first with every discovery if it constantly discover new insights and fixes old ones.

Q: What role does marshalling evidence play in the process of “learning through” in literature?

“knowledge of the kind associated with ‘living through’ is not amenable to evidential support” (343)

The process of “learning through” seems to be integral to the cognitive value of literature. This seems to be the essential aspect involved in the meaning we derive from works of literature. Accordingly, I did not immediately understand what Lamarque and Olsen meant when they implied that marshalling evidence was required for knowledge to be obtained, but the process of “learning through” did not involve marshalling evidence.

It seems that when we “learn through” a piece of literature, we are using our own experiences as the marshalling evidence. We ultimately decide to accept a conclusion implied in a piece of literature based of our comparison of this fictitious series of events to our own experiences. Consequently, I am not entirely sure as to why Lamarque and Olsen insist that knowledge associated with “living through” is not open to evidential support. I would simply respond by stating that we use our own experiences as evidential support.

Response to Andrew (A preference for pluralism)

I certainly found Andrew’s response to the critical pluralism/ monism debate to be intriguing. Andrew centered his support of critical pluralism on its practicality. I certainly understand this viewpoint, as monism does seem to represent an unreachable idea.

This post does raise an interesting theme in regards to the two sides of this debate. It seems as though this debate could be framed in a way that associates pluralism with practicality, and monism with idealism. I think that it can easily be agreed upon that monism represents an ideal. If monism were true, the process of interpretation would turn into a sort of science. Of course, pluralism is beneficial in its own right because of the fact that it accepts a diverse range of interpretations, rather than scolding someone for arriving at the incorrect interpretation. However, this debate seems almost pointless because of the fact that, as Andrew points out, monism seems unpractical.

In Response to Avery (Answering All the Questions)

In response to Nehamas’ claim that an ideal interpretation is one that is able to answer every possible question raised about a text, and that this an impossible ideal, Avery states that this ideal is “quite possible”. Avery posits that, while a writer may not initially come up with all of these answers, it is possible over time.

I certainly agree with Avery that it would be an impossible task to answer all possible question related to a text in one draft. However, I question the statement that all questions can even be answered with an unlimited amount of drafts. As Avery states in his post, “one can raise a great deal, if not an infinite number of questions about any given text”. If this is true, it seems that it may be an impossible task (although a certain ideal) to develop an interpretation that can answer every single question related to a text.

Subsequent to Brett’s in-class reading, the discussion about metaphor seems to have reemerged. Accordingly, I thought I should mention a point regarding metaphors that I have wanted to bring up. Everyone seems to be sure that a metaphors meaning can easily be determined; however, I wonder how much confidence we can put into most interpretations that we give. In other words, how sure can we be that a certain interpretation is the correct one? I understand that we have textual evidence, but how strong of a case does this evidence provide us?

Donald Davidson, in short, views metaphors as a linguistic tool in which no linguistic rules can apply because metaphorical language does not abide by normal linguistic functions. Accordingly, metaphors cannot be described as having literal function. This leads to my next point in regards to metaphors: Does Davidson actually maintain that metaphors do not have any meaning? According to Davidson, "the attempt to give literal expression to the content of the metaphor is simply misguided”. But, does this mean that metaphors do not have meaning? Most of the blogposts I have read have argued against the idea that metaphors do not have any meaning, implying that Davidson held this stance. However, I am not fully sold on this. Davidson believed that metaphors did have a function of pointing the reader to some novel understanding or insight. He only did not view metaphors as being able to be described in a literal fashion. I wonder if we are misinterpreting his stance in stating that he simply viewed metaphors as having no meaning.

Mid-Reading Note-

Although it is not a major problem, I do think there may be an inherent contradiction within Stecker’s writing piece on interpretation.

On page 274, when discussion the nature of “acceptable interpretations, Stecker says, “Such interpretations are acceptable because they satisfy criteria of acceptability which have nothing to do with the truth of these interpretations.”

Later, Stecker says, “To be acceptable, [acceptable interpretations] must be consistent with some facts about the work.” Accordingly, it seems that acceptableness does in some way have to do with the truth of the interpretation. As I previously states, not a big issue, but I find it interesting none the less.

In Response to Andrew “Red in Tooth and Claw”

I enjoyed reading Andrew’s post, which was a comment direct towards Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer was quoted as saying, "every animal can maintain its own existence only by the incessant elimination of another's”. Andrew responded to this by giving the converse example of symbiosis, where a relationship between animals benefits both groups. I agree with Andrew in that symbiosis presents a counter example to Schopenhauer’s claim, but it seems that this conversation may be missing Schopenhauer’s central point. I think that Schopenhauer makes the statement quoted above primarily because of the lack of resources that exist in our universe. Naturally, it one animal obtains a certain resource, it means that another animal will have a lack of that resource. Accordingly, this is why he states that in order for every animal to maintain its existence, it needs to eliminate another’s in the process. It is my belief, unfortunately, that Schopenhauer was spot-on with this observation. We live in a society in which there are scarce resources and vast population of diverse individuals.

In Response to Kyle “Free Will”

I was really happy to see Kyle’s post regarding our recent class discussion about free will. Kyle made the comment during class that determinism may be difficult to apply to a completely novel circumstance. As he states in his post, this idea was possible pre-maturely thrown out because of the fact that there are no such thing as completely novel circumstances. I think that I was the person that pointed this out, but from what I remember, I do not think I was able to make this point in a clear manner. Accordingly, it seems that Kyle may have felt that this idea of a completely novel circumstance was thrown out prematurely.

First, I should point out that the idea of a CNC is a great point to make during a discussion on free will. However, I want to make my point across in a more clear and concise manner. In order for humans to intercept any experience, it must be broken down into smaller cognitive components that the brain already understands. Accordingly, every human experience that it is able to be perceived is somehow related to some other experience. Although, conceptually it seems possible to have a experience a CNC, this is simply not possible. At least not from the way in which the human brain functions. We may have experiences that, from a holistic view, are completely novel, but they are not actually a CNC. If this experience were broken down into its simple components, it would have to be related to another experience.

In Response to Brandon Gaudet (Similar Conclusions)

Not to sound repetitive, but I really enjoyed reading the recent posts by Krystal and Brandon regarding the fact that us philosophers seem to ultimately reach the same conclusions. As Brandon rightly points out, the majorities of students/professors in the philosophy department are in support of veganism, are agnostic, and have an inherent aversion towards capitalism. In addition, this may not be as significant, but I have never met a philosopher that is very conservative in his or her political views. I find this information to be profound because of the fact that many view philosophy as a discipline that asks many questions, but ultimately does not reach many conclusions. I find this statement to be particularly fallacious because philosophy has caused me to question the conclusions I am told by other in a way that no other discipline has.

While perusing through the various blogpost recent published online, another post I particularly found fascinating was Corey’s post regarding the two possible consequences of gaining knowledge. Before I go on, I should elucidate what I mean by consequences. In this case, consequence stands in reference to a optimistic or pessimistic mind state.

So, in Corey’s post, he first mentions the fact that Schopenauer once stated that with the acquisition of knowledge comes further pessimism. While this statement was clearly defined in class, Corey offered another possible consequence of further knowledge: the chance to escape suffering. I was intrigued by this second option because it is something that Schopenauer himself does not explicitly mention. However, it is interesting because it does seem that he did possible support this view as well. Schopenauer of course, was known for his support of eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism; accordingly, he did see a route to escape the endless suffering in life. Taken from this, it could be said that increased knowledge could lead to this realization that the endless suffering could be escaped. Thus, it would almost seem that knowledge would not actually lead to pessimism, alluding to Corey’s second option.

Although this does seem possible, I am not sure whether increased knowledge is what leads an individual towards this state of nirvana. Of course, an individual must obtain the knowledge to begin this process permanent bliss, however, it almost seems like the process itself has nothing to do with the acquisition of knowledge. Instead, it is characterized by the silencing of the mind. In order to end the suffering which is characterized by the endless striving, the philosophies of many eastern religions seemed to advocate for behaviors such as living in the present moment, or focusing on bodily sensations. The goal would be to quiet the mind, not add to it. In this sense it seems that ending the suffering would necessarily be the result of increased knowledge, but rather escape from the process of thinking all together.

In Response to Avery (Inverted Viewpoints)

Subsequent to my reading of Corey and Avery’s blogpost’s regarding pessimism and social class, I immediately wanted to post my own response. First, I found this subject particularly fascinating. In addition, viewed prima facie, based off of my own experiences, I would have to say that I agree with Corey and Avery. It does seem that individuals that represent lower socioeconomic status do seem to be more optimistic. Not to point out the obvious, but the irony in this is fascinating.

The psychologist in me would want to examine the reasons for this relationship. As Avery briefly mentioned, it could be that people from less-prosperous backgrounds need something to give them comfort in the middle of their struggle. Instead of relying on drugs and alcohol, a much better fix would be to have the belief that everything is going to get better; no matter how irrational this belief may be. In contrast the well-off person will not need this mental support system because they will be OK no matter what they believe. This leads into the essential function of an optimistic mind state. While often irrational and misguided, and almost seems better to be optimistic because it allows an individual to function in times of high stress. If an individual decides to adopt a pessimistic mind state, they may not find the mental strength or will to handle many of their future responsibilities.

In Response to Krystal “Antiheroic Inspiration”

Krystal posted a response to a blogpost written by Avery regarding the recent surge of flawed heroes within literature (or media in general). Avery briefly argued against the idea that this was a problem, which, according to Avery, is a stance that many theorists seem to have taken. Krystal, agreed with Avery, but also added that this subject reminded her of the contentions surrounding the topic of violence in video games.

I would have to agree with both Avery and Krystal in that it is problematic to claim antihero’s should not be popular because people might want to emulate there lackluster characteristics. However, I am not as sure about the comparison to violence in videogames. From the literature that I have on the subject, it seems that the relationship between violence and videogames is, well, quite simply overstated. However, this is not to say that there is no such thing. There has been researching successfully illustrating the fact that children will often intimidate actions that they witness other perform, including violence. However, no real causal link has been shown between video games and children’s behavior. Accordingly, I do not view antiheroes within fiction as being problematic because of the imitation factor, just as I do not view certain types of videogames as being problematic for the same reason. For the record, I do think there are other issues involved with allowing young children to play adult videogames, however I do not find the intimidation factor to be the problem.

In Response to Tom "Claim for my philosophical essay"

I agree with Nicole in that Psychology is a domain that provides evidence in support of claims, but may not in itself be able to propose how thing ought to be. However, I think this statement is certainly underestimating the importance of psychological methodology within philosophical discourse. In order to illustrate this I will use the example that Nicole provides. Yes, psychology does not tell us that mentally disabled persons should not be euthanized. But, is this telling action even required? In a lot of cases, just from using an elementary level of reasoning, it should be evident what decisions should be made based of psychological data.

I think that it should also be noted that, without psychological data, many of the decisions that Nicole outlines could not be made appropriately. For example, without Psychological research methods, we would understand the human mind well enough to make decisions about how we ought to act in many cases. The process of providing evidence for these axiological claims are as important as making the claims themselves.

“However, you see, psychology has not told us that it is wrong to euthanize people with down syndrome”

I thought this statement was intriguing because it seems to be much more contentious then it looks on the surface. It seems that the veracity of this statement is dependent upon what the word told denotes in this situation. It could be argued that psychology does in fact tell us that it is wrong to euthanize disabled persons because of the data that it has provided. Of course, it does not explicitly state what we ought to do, but the data may contain the implicit implication of the action that should be taken. Furthermore, as I previously stated, without this data, it would not be clearly known what type of rights disabled persons are due.

One last point that I think should be made regarding psychology and its importance within philosophical discourse. It is important that we do not forget that the field of psychology developed directly out of philosophy. The first psychologists were in fact, primarily philosophers. For example, one of the founders of psychology, William James, was a philosopher before he was a psychologist. These things should not be forgotten when we are evaluating the importance of psychology within philosophical discourse. Psychology is, in essence, a major sub domain within philosophy.

In Response to Corey

I had read a previous response to this post, written by Brett, which I certainly agreed with. However, I also wanted to comment on a specific area of this same post.

“but to what harm does it cause fans of literature to have several different ways to analyze the work?”

By itself, I do not think it is very problematic to have multiple interpretations of a piece of literature. However, it think it is highly problematic for all interpretations to be viewed equally. In other words, I think that, when interpreting a piece of literature, certain factors need to be taken into account. Furthermore, the author’s intention needs to be one of these central factors. It is not as though there needs to be one, distinct, correct interpretation. However, I think that the author’s intention should certainly be brought into all considerations. In my view, if a reader interprets a certain work in a new way; and, this new interpretation could not have been something that the author considered when writing the piece; this consideration should not hold as much weight in discussions of that work. With that said, I do think it is fallacious to assume that author’s intentions are always the correct way to interpret the work, I think that these intentions should be the major factor when interpreting a work. Allowing any interpretation to hold the same way seems to have the same level of problematicity as labeling art as anything and everything. Allowing every interpretation to be accepted seems to make the process of interpreting works of literature minuscule in importance.