Deus ex machina

“Can books be characterized as being moral/immoral?”

This question is not exactly taken from my Q&A from this week, but it is defiantly an issue that I have wanted to bring up. This is primarily due to the discussion that we had during class on Friday. In the class, this question seemed be a large contention held within the body of students in our class. Although we did move on from the subject, I do not think we came to a complete agreement.

I think Shelby said it best when she stated that a book can content moral content, but the book in itself does not contain any moral value. I completely agree with this, but I should also point out that this is not to state that by book, we are referencing the actual object. No, the story In itself is actually what is being referenced. However, although many may think that the story itself can be characterized as being moral/immoral, I disagree. I agree with Jacob in that morality is characterized by actions. Accordingly, although a book may seem to encourage certain moral/immoral actions, I do not think the book can be characterized as such. It still takes the individual reading the text to interpret the book in their own way, and then make a choice in regards to how they should act.

I do agree with Nicole when she brought up the idea that all interpretations of a book are not correct (although, this is an entirely different issue). Consequently, it could be assumed that since there is only one specific type of way to interpret a book, if the book contains certain moral truths, it should not matter how the viewer interprets the book; the book would then be characterized as being moral/immoral. I do not agree with this because I still is up to the viewer how they want to fit the ideas within the book into their own structure of ideas. The book does not have any power morally until the viewer turns them into some action. For this reason, I do not agree with the idea that a book can characterized as moral/immoral.

I found Andrew’s blogpost interesting because of the fact that it questions the importance of our discussions this week. I think that it is always good to question the importance of a philosophical debate of which we are trying to provide an answer to. However, I think when it comes to the question of whether emotions are important in works of fiction, this has an easy answer: absolutely.

First, this debate is important within philosophical discussion simply of because of the fact that there is not a perfect explanation to the so-called “paradox of fiction”. This debate is still on-going, and it is truly a problem within the discipline of philosophy that has not been solved. Looking at the paradox, it is does seem very interesting that a fictitious even could elicit strong emotional reactions.

Aside, from the fact that the “paradox of fiction” in itself is an extremely important debate within the discipline of philosophy, I think that it must be acknowledged that the ability of fiction to elicit emotions is essential to the power of fiction as a form of expression. As many have previously stated, works of fiction are often more effective in expressing truths within moral philosophy because fiction is able to elicit emotions better than so-called dry-forms of philosophical writing. Writers of fiction can craft stories that can influence the reader in ways that philosophical treaties cannot accomplish because of the fact that they are able to have a strong effect on the affective component of human beings. Accordingly, I do not think the ability for works of fictions to elicit emotional response to ever be downplayed.

In Response to Nicole (Unfelt Emotions)

I am certainly interested by a contention that Nicole’s blogpost alludes to, which is, the idea of whether an artist can express an emotion that they have not felt before. After identifying this contention, Nicole stated that it is likely that the author must have experienced the emotion in which they are trying to express.

Taken prima facie, I would agree that the author must have experienced an emotion in order to experience it. How could they possibly know how to portray an emotion unless that have experienced it? However, after further consideration, it seems that there may be examples illustrating the opposite as the case. For example, couldn’t an artist possibly read about the characteristics of a particular emotion in a book, and using this information, be able to portray that emotion in a piece of art without actually experiencing that emotion themselves? This does seem entirely possible.

“But I think it may also be possible for the artist to be expressing an entirely different emotion through a subject matter that no one (or at least, almost no one) could have lived through themselves.”

I was intrigued by this statement made in this blogpost, but it also was slightly confusing. I take that Nicole meant that an author could portray an event (i.e. subject matter) that is extremely unlikely to occur in anyone’s life, but it still is able to express an emotion that others will understand. If this is the case then I agree with this statement. However, I would also like to point out that the viewers of that subject matter must at least understand what it occurring in this novel subject at least in some manner for them to be able to interpret the emotions. A the very least, the viewer must be able to recognize at least on component of this subject matter. For example, they would only need to see a human face in order to understand the emotional meaning of the work. But, if there was absolutely no component of the work that the viewer could recognize, then I do not think they would be able to decipher the emotional content.

Response to Q&A #4 (Question 1)

Q- “Is the process of interpreting works of fiction an automatic, implicit process, or rather, is it something that we can control?”

In his attempt at providing an answer to the so-called “paradox of fiction, Kendall Walton describes a process of pretending which takes place, in which the viewer chooses to participate the this game of pretend. At least, I previously though that Walton believed that viewer must willingly decide that they want to participate. This was until I read this excerpt from the IEP:

“Such games rely on what Walton calls “constituent principles” (e.g., that whenever there is a glob of mud in a certain orange crate, it is make-believedly true that there is a pie in the oven) which are accepted or understood to be operating. However, these principles need not be explicit, deliberate, or even public”

This lead me to question whether Walton viewed the process of participation in the make-believe game as occurring automatically, or whether the viewer was always aware of its occurrence. I find this distinction to be important because I think Walton’s “pretend theory” would be significantly flawed if he did not label this process as being able to occur implicitly and automatically.

This process of pretending would have to be an implicit cognitive process (i.e. occurring without the individual’s awareness) because, if it were not, it would easily be proved false. For example, if a person consciously decides to not take part in this game of make believe, they will still be effected emotionally. Making the conscious decision to play-along with a fictitious event has no barring as to whether that event will be able to effect them emotionally. Accordingly, the only way in which Walton’s theory could be plausible would be for him to define this process of make believe as an implicit cognitive process.